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Abstrat
Given an argumentation framework AF, we introdue a mapping funtion that onstruts
a disjuntive logi program P, suh that the preferred extensions of AF orrespond to
the stable models of P, after interseting eah stable model with the relevant atoms. The
given mapping funtion is of polynomial size w.r.t. AF.
In partiular, we identify that there is a diret relationship between the minimal models
of a propositional formula and the preferred extensions of an argumentation framework by
working on representing the defeated arguments. Then we show how to infer the preferred
extensions of an argumentation framework by using UNSAT algorithms and disjuntive
stable model solvers. The relevane of this result is that we dene a diret relationship
between one of the most satisfatory argumentation semantis and one of the most su-
essful approah of non-monotoni reasoning i.e. logi programming with the stable model
semantis.
KEYWORDS: preferred semantis, abstrat argumentation semantis, stable model se-
mantis, minimal models.
1 Introdution
Dung's approah, presented in (Dung 1995), is a unifying framework whih has
played an inuential role on argumentation researh and Artiial Intelligene (AI).
In fat, Dung's approah has inuened subsequent proposals for argumentation
systems, e.g., (Benh-Capon 2002). Besides, Dung's approah is mainly relevant in
elds where onit management plays a entral role. For instane, Dung showed
∗ This is a revised and improved version of the paper Inferring preferred extensions by minimal
models whih appeared in Guillermo R. Simari and Paolo Torroni (Eds), proeedings of the
workshop Argumentation and Non-Monotoni Reasoning (LPNMR-07 Workshop).
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that his theory naturally aptures the solutions of the theory of n-person games
and the well-known stable marriage problem.
Dung dened four argumentation semantis: stable semantis, preferred seman-
tis, grounded semantis, and omplete semantis. The entral notion of these se-
mantis is the aeptability of the arguments. The main argumentation semantis
for olletive aeptability are the grounded semantis and the preferred seman-
tis (Prakken and Vreeswijk 2002; ASPIC:Projet 2005). The rst one represents a
skeptial approah and the seond one represents a redulous approah.
Dung showed that argumentation an be viewed as logi programming with nega-
tion as failure. Speially, he showed that the grounded semantis an be harater-
ized by the well-founded semantis (Gelder et al. 1991), and the stable semantis
by the stable model semantis (Gelfond and Lifshitz 1991). This result is of great
importane beause it introdues a general method for generating metainterpreters
for argumentation systems (Dung 1995). Following this issue, we will prove that it
is possible to haraterize the preferred semantis based on the minimal models of a
propositional formula (Theorem 1). We will also show that the preferred semantis
an be haraterized by the stable models of a positive disjuntive logi program
(Theorem 3). The importane of this haraterization is that we are dening a di-
ret relationship between one of the most satisfatory argumentation semantis and
may be the most suessful approah of non-monotoni reasoning of the last two
deades i.e. logi programming with the stable model semantis.
As a natural onsequene of our result, we present two easy-to-use forms for
inferring the preferred extensions of an argumentation framework (AF ). The rst
one is based on a mapping funtion whih is quadrati size w.r.t. the number of
arguments of AF and UNSAT algorithms. The seond one is also based on a map-
ping funtion whih is quadrati size w.r.t. the number of arguments of AF and
disjuntive stable model solvers.
It is worth mentioning that the deision problem of the preferred semantis is hard
sine it is o-NP-Complete (Dunne and Benh-Capon 2004). In fat, we an nd dif-
ferent strategies for omputing the preferred semantis (Besnard and Doutre 2004;
Cayrol et al. 2003; Dung et al. 2006; Dung et al. 2007). However, we an nd re-
ally few implementations of them (ASPIC:Projet 2006; Gaertner and Toni 2007).
One of the relevant points of our result is that we an take advane of eient
disjuntive stable model solvers, e.g., the DLV System (DLV 1996), for inferring
the preferred semantis. The DLV System is a suessful stable model solver that
inludes dedutive database optimization tehniques, and non-monotoni reason-
ing optimization tehniques in order to improve its performane (Leone et al. 2002;
Gebser et al. 2007). In fat, we an implement the preferred semantis inside objet-
oriented programs based on our haraterization and the DLV JAVA Wrapper
(Ria 2003).
The rest of the paper is divided as follows: In 2, we present some basi onepts
of logi programs and argumentation theory. In 3, we present a haraterization
of the preferred semantis by minimal models. In 4, we present how to ompute
the preferred semantis by using the minimal models of a positive disjuntive logi
program. Finally in the last setion, we present our onlusions.
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2 Bakground
In this setion, we present the syntax of a valid logi program, the denition of the
stable model semantis, and the denition of the preferred semantis. We will use
basi well-known denitions in omplexity theory suh as that of o-NP-omplete
problem.
2.1 Logi Programs: Syntax
The language of a propositional logi has an alphabet onsisting of
(i) A signature L that is a nite set of elements that we all atoms, denoted usually
as p0, p1, ...
(ii) onnetives : ∨,∧,←,¬,⊥,⊤
(iii) auxiliary symbols : ( , ).
where ∨,∧,← are 2-plae onnetives, ¬ is 1-plae onnetive and ⊥,⊤ are 0-plae
onnetives or onstant symbols. A literal is an atom, a, or the negation of an atom
¬a. Given a set of atoms {a1, ..., an}, we write ¬{a1, ..., an} to denote the set of
literals {¬a1, ...,¬an}. Formulæ are onstruted as usual in logi. A theory T is a
nite set of formulæ. By LT , we denote the signature of T, namely the set of atoms
that our in T.
A general lause, C, is denoted by a1 ∨ . . . ∨ am ← l1, . . . , ln,1 where m ≥ 0,
n ≥ 0, m + n > 0, eah ai is an atom, and eah li is a literal. When n = 0 and
m > 0 the lause is an abbreviation of a1 ∨ . . . ∨ am ← ⊤. When m = 0 the lause
is an abbreviation of ⊥ ← l1, . . . , ln. Clauses of this form are alled onstraints (the
rest, non-onstraint lauses). A general program, P , is a nite set of general lauses.
Given a universe U , we dene the omplement of a set S ⊆ U as S˜ = U \ S.
We point out that whenever we onsider logi programs our negation ¬ orre-
sponds to the default negation not used in Logi Programming. Also, it is onvenient
to remark that in this paper we are not using at all the so alled strong negation
used in ASP.
2.2 Stable Model Semantis
First, to dene the stable model semantis, let us dene some relevant onepts.
Denition 1
Let T be a theory, an interpretation I is a mapping from LT to {0, 1} meeting the
onditions:
1. I(a ∧ b) = min{I(a), I(b)},
2. I(a ∨ b) = max{I(a), I(b)},
3. I(a← b) = 0 i I(b) = 1 and I(a) = 0,
4. I(¬a) = 1− I(a),
1 l1, . . . , ln represents the formula l1 ∧ · · · ∧ ln.
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5. I(⊥) = 0.
6. I(⊤) = 1.
It is standard to provide interpretations only in terms of a mapping from LT to
{0, 1}. Moreover it is easy to prove that this mapping is unique by virtue of the
denition by reursion (van Dalen 1994).
An interpretation I is alled a model of P i for eah lause c ∈ P , I(c) = 1. A
theory is onsistent if it admits a model, otherwise it is alled inonsistent. Given a
theory T and a formula α, we say that α is a logial onsequene of T , denoted by
T |= α, if for every model I of T it holds that I(α) = 1. It is a well known result that
T |= α i T ∪{¬α} is inonsistent. It is possible to identify an interpretation with a
subset of a given signature. For any interpretation, the orresponding subset of the
signature is the set of all atoms that are true w.r.t. the interpretation. Conversely,
given an arbitrary subset of the signature, there is a orresponding interpretation
dened by speifying that the mapping assigned to an atom in the subset is equal
to 1 and otherwise to 0. We use this view of interpretations freely in the rest of the
paper.
We say that a model I of a theory T is a minimal model if there does not exist
a model I ′ of T dierent from I suh that I ′ ⊂ I. Maximal models are dened in
the analogous form.
By using logi programming with stable model semantis, it is possible to desribe
a omputational problem as a logi program whose stable models orrespond to the
solutions of the given problem. The following denition of a stable model for general
programs was presented in (Gelfond and Lifshitz 1991).
Let P be any general program. For any set S ⊆ LP , let PS be the general program
obtained from P by deleting
(i) eah rule that has a formula ¬l in its body with l ∈ S, and then
(ii) all formulæ of the form ¬l in the bodies of the remaining rules.
Clearly PS does not ontain ¬. Hene S is a stable model of P i S is a minimal
model of PS .
In order to illustrate this denition let us onsider the following example:
Example 1
Let S = {b} and P be the following logi program:
b← ¬a. b← ⊤.
c← ¬b. c← a.
We an see that PS is:
b← ⊤. c← a.
Notie that PS has two models: {b} and {a, b, c}. Sine the minimal model amongst
these models is {b}, we an say that S is a stable model of P .
2.3 Argumentation theory
Now, we dene some basi onepts of Dung's argumentation approah. The rst
one is that of an argumentation framework. An argumentation framework aptures
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the relationships between the arguments (All the denitions of this subsetion were
taken from the seminal paper (Dung 1995)).
Denition 2
An argumentation framework is a pair AF = 〈AR, attacks〉, where AR is a nite
set of arguments, and attaks is a binary relation on AR, i.e. attaks ⊆ AR×AR.
For two arguments a and b, we say that a attaks b (or b is attaked by a) if
attacks(a, b) holds. Notie that the relation attaks does not yet tell us with whih
arguments a dispute an be won; it only tells us the relation of two oniting
arguments.
It is worth mentioning that any argumentation framework an be regarded as
a direted graph. For instane, if AF = 〈{a, b, c}, {(a, b), (b, c)}〉, then AF an be
represented as shown in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1. Graph representation of the argumentation framework AF =
〈{a, b, c}, {(a, b), (b, c)}〉.
Denition 3
A set S of arguments is said to be onit-free if there are no arguments a, b in S
suh that a attaks b.
A entral notion of Dung's framework is aeptability. It aptures how an argu-
ment that annot defend itself, an be proteted by a set of arguments.
Denition 4
(1) An argument a ∈ AR is aeptable w.r.t. a set S of arguments i for eah
argument b ∈ AR: If b attaks a then b is attaked by an argument in S. (2) A
onit-free set of arguments S is admissible i eah argument in S is aeptable
w.r.t. S.
Let us onsider the argumentation framework AF of Fig. 1. We an see that
AF has three admissible sets: {}, {a} and {a, c}. Intuitively, an admissible set is
a oherent point of view. Sine an argumentation framework ould have several
oherent point of views, one an take the maximum admissible sets in order to
get maximum oherent point of views of an argumentation framework. This idea is
aptured by Dung's framework with the onept of preferred extension.
Denition 5
A preferred extension of an argumentation framework AF is a maximal (w.r.t.
inlusion) admissible set of AF .
Sine an argumentation framework ould have more than one preferred extension,
the preferred semantis is alled redulous. The argumentation framework of Fig.
1 has just one preferred extension whih is {a, c}.
6 J. C. Nieves, M. Osorio, and U. Cortés
Remark 1
By denition, it is lear that any argument whih belongs to a preferred extension
E is aeptable w.r.t. E. Hene we will say that any argument whih does not
belong to some preferred extension is a defeated argument.
3 Preferred extensions and UNSAT problem
In this setion, we will dene a mapping funtion that onstruts a propositional
formula, suh that its minimal models haraterize the preferred extensions of an ar-
gumentation framework. This haraterization will provide a method for omputing
preferred extensions based on Model Cheking and Unsatisability (UNSAT).
In order to haraterize the preferred semantis in terms of minimal models, we
will introdue some onepts.
Denition 6
Let T be a theory with signature L. We say that L′ is a opy-signature of L i
• L ∩ L′ = ∅,
• the ardinality of L′ is the same to L and
• there is a bijetive funtion f from L to L′.
It is well known that there exists a bijetive funtion from one set to another if
both sets have the same ardinality. Now one an establish an important relation-
ship between maximal and minimal models.
Proposition 1
Let T be a theory with signature LT . Let L′ be a opy-signature of LT . By g(T )
we denote the theory obtained from T by replaing every ourrene of an atom x
in T by ¬f(x). Then M is a maximal model of T i f(LT \M) is a minimal model
of g(T ).
Proof
See Appendix A.
Our representations of an argumentation framework use the prediate d(x), where
the intended meaning of d(x) is: the argument x is defeated. By onsidering the
prediate d(x), we will dene a mapping funtion from an argumentation framework
to a propositional formula. This propositional formula aptures two basi onditions
whih make an argument to be defeated.
Denition 7
Let AF = 〈AR, attacks〉 be an argumentation framework, then α(AF ) is dened
as follows:
α(AF ) =
^
a∈AR
((
^
b:(b,a)∈attacks
d(a)← ¬d(b)) ∧ (
^
b:(b,a)∈attacks
d(a)←
^
c:(c,b)∈attacks
d(c)))
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1. The rst ondition of α(AF ) (
∧
b:(b,a)∈attacks d(a)← ¬d(b)) suggests that the
argument a is defeated when any one of its adversaries is not defeated.
2. The seond ondition of α(AF ) (
∧
b:(b,a)∈attacks d(a) ←
∧
c:(c,b)∈attacks d(c))
suggests that the argument a is defeated when all the arguments that defend2
a are defeated.
Sine α(AF ) aptures onditions whih make an argument to be defeated, it is
quite obvious that any argument whih satises these onditions ould not belong
to an admissible set. Therefore these arguments also ould not belong to a preferred
extension.
Notie that α(AF ) is a nite grounded formula, this means that it does not on-
tain prediates with variables; hene, α(AF ) is essentially a propositional formula
(just onsidering the atoms like d(a) as d_a) of propositional logi. In order to
illustrate the propositional formula α(AF ), let us onsider the following example.
Example 2
Let AF = 〈AR, attacks〉 be the argumentation framework of Fig. 1. We an see
that α(AF ) is:
(d(b)← ¬d(a)) ∧ (d(b)← ⊤) ∧ (d(c)← ¬d(b)) ∧ (d(c)← d(a))
Observe that α(AF ) has no propositional lauses w.r.t. argument a. This is essen-
tially beause α(AF ) is apturing the arguments whih ould be defeated and the
argument a will be always an aeptable argument.
It is worth mentioning that given an argumentation framework AF , α(AF ) will
have at most 2n2 propositional lauses suh that n is the number of arguments in
AR and the maximum length3 of eah propositional lause is n+ 1. Hene, we an
say that α(AF ) is quadrati size w.r.t. the number of arguments of AF .
Essentially α(AF ) is a propositional representation of the argumentation frame-
work AF . However α(AF ) has the property that its minimal models haraterize
AF 's preferred extensions. In order to formalize this property, let us onsider the fol-
lowing proposition whih was proved by Besnard and Doutre in (Besnard and Doutre 2004).
Proposition 2
(Besnard and Doutre 2004) Let AF = 〈AR, attacks〉 be an argumentation frame-
work. Let β(AF ) be the formula:
∧
a∈AR
((a→
∧
b:(b,a)∈attacks
¬b) ∧ (a→
∧
b:(b,a)∈attacks
(
∨
c:(c,b)∈attacks
c)))
then, a set S ⊆ AR is a preferred extension i S is a maximal model of the formula
β(AF ).
2
We say that c defends a if b attaks a and c attaks b.
3
The length of our propositional lauses C is given by the number of atoms in the head of C
plus the number of literals in the body of C
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In ontrast with α(AF ) whih aptures onditions whih make an argument to be
defeated, β(AF ) aptures onditions whih make an argument aeptable. However,
we will prove that when the mapping f(x) of the theory g(β(AF )) orresponds to
d(x) suh that x ∈ AF , α(AF ) is logially equivalent to g(β(AF )) (see the proof
of Theorem 1). For instane, let us onsider the argumentation framework AF of
Example 2. The formula β(AF ) is:
(¬a← b) ∧ (⊥ ← b) ∧ (¬b← c) ∧ (a← c)
If we replae eah atom x by the expression ¬d(x), we get:
(¬¬d(a)← ¬d(b)) ∧ (⊥ ← ¬d(b)) ∧ (¬¬d(b)← ¬d(c)) ∧ (¬d(a)← ¬d(c))
Now, if we apply transposition to eah impliation, we obtain:
(d(b)← ¬d(a)) ∧ (d(b)← ⊤) ∧ (d(c)← ¬d(b)) ∧ (d(c)← d(a))
The latter formula orresponds to α(AF ). The following theorem is a straightfor-
ward onsequene of Proposition 2 and Proposition 1. Given an argumentation
framework AF = 〈AR, attacks〉 and E ⊆ AR, we dene the set compl(E) as
{d(a)|a ∈ AR \ E}. Essentially, compl(E) expresses the omplement of E w.r.t.
AR.
Theorem 1
Let AF = 〈AR, attacks〉 be an argumentation framework and S ⊆ AR. When the
mapping f(x) of the theory g(β(AF )) orresponds to d(x) suh that x ∈ AR, the
following ondition holds: S is a preferred extension of AF i compl(S) is a minimal
model of α(AF ).
Proof
See Appendix A.
This theorem shows that it is possible to haraterize the preferred extensions
of an argumentation framework AF by onsidering the minimal models of α(AF ).
In order to illustrate Theorem 1, let us onsider again α(AF ) of Example 2. This
formula has three models: {d(b)}, {d(b), d(c)} and {d(a), d(b), d(c)}. Then, the only
minimal model is {d(b)}, this implies that {a, c} is the only preferred extension of
AF. In fat, eah model of α(AF ) implies an admissible set of AF, this means that
{a, c}, {a} and {} are the admissible sets of AF.
There is a well known relationship between minimal models and logial onse-
quene, see (Osorio et al. 2004). The following proposition is a diret onsequene of
suh relationship. Let S be a set of well formed formulæ then we dene SetT oFormula(S) =∧
c∈S c.
Proposition 3
Let AF = 〈AR, attacks〉 be an argumentation framework and S ⊆ AR. S is
a preferred extension of AF i compl(S) is a model of α(AF ) and α(AF ) ∧
SetT oFormula(¬ ˜compl(S)) |= SetT oFormula(compl(S)).
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Proof
See Appendix A.
There are several well-known approahes for inferring minimal models from a
propositional formula (Dimopoulos and Torres 1996; Ben-Eliyahu-Zohary 2005). For
instane, it is possible to use UNSAT's algorithms for inferring minimal models.
Hene, it is lear that we an use UNSAT's algorithms for omputing the pre-
ferred extensions of an argumentation framework. This idea is formalized with the
following proposition.
Theorem 2
Let AF = 〈AR, attacks〉 be an argumentation framework and S ⊆ AR. S is a
preferred extension of AF if and only if compl(S) is a model of α(AF ) and α(AF )∧
SetT oFormula(¬ ˜compl(S)) ∧ ¬SetT oFormula(compl(S)) is unsatisable.
Proof
Diretly, by Proposition 3.
In order to illustrate Theorem 2, let us onsider again the argumentation frame-
work AF of Example 2. Let S = {a}, then compl(S) = {d(b), d(c)}. We have
already seen that {d(b), d(c)} is a model of α(AF ), hene the formula to verify its
unsatisability is:
(d(b)← ¬d(a)) ∧ (d(b)← ⊤) ∧ (d(c)← ¬d(b)) ∧ (d(c)← d(a))∧
¬d(a) ∧ (¬d(b) ∨ ¬d(c))
However, this formula is satisable by the model {d(b)}, then {a} is not a preferred
extension. Now, let S = {a, c}, then compl(S) = {d(b)}. As seen before, {d(b)} is
also a model of α(AF ), hene the formula to verify its unsatisability is:
(d(b)← ¬d(a)) ∧ (d(b)← ⊤) ∧ (d(c)← ¬d(b)) ∧ (d(c)← d(a))∧
¬d(a) ∧ ¬d(c) ∧ ¬d(b)
It is easy to see that this formula is unsatisable, therefore {a, c} is a preferred
extension.
The relevane of Theorem 2 is that UNSAT is the prototypial and best-researhed
o-NP-omplete problem. Hene, Theorem 2 opens the possibilities for using a wide
variety of algorithms for inferring the preferred semantis.
4 Preferred extensions and general programs
We have seen that the minimal models of α(AF ) haraterize the preferred exten-
sions of AF . One interesting point of α(AF ) is that α(AF ) is logially equivalent
to the positive disjuntive logi program ΓAF (dened below). It is well known that
given a positive disjuntive logi program P , all the minimal models of P orre-
spond to the stable models of P . This property will be enough for haraterizing the
preferred semantis by the stable models of the positive disjuntive logi program
ΓAF .
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We start this setion by dening a mapping funtion whih is a variation of the
mapping of Denition 7.
Denition 8
Let AF = 〈AR, attacks〉 be an argumentation framework and a ∈ AR. We dene
the transformation funtion Γ(a) as follows:
Γ(a) = {
⋃
b:(b,a)∈attacks
{d(a) ∨ d(b)}} ∪ {
⋃
b:(b,a)∈attacks
{d(a)←
∧
c:(c,b)∈attacks
d(c)}}
Now we dene the funtion Γ in terms of an argumentation framework.
Denition 9
Let AF = 〈AR, attacks〉 be an argumentation framework. We dene its assoiated
general program as follows:
ΓAF =
⋃
a∈AR
Γ(a)
Remark 2
Notie that α(AF ) (see Denition 7) is similar to ΓAF . The main syntati dier-
ene of ΓAF w.r.t. α(AF ) is the rst part of ΓAF whih is (
∧
b:(b,a)∈attacks(d(a) ∨
d(b))); however this part is logially equivalent to the rst part of α(AF ) whih is
(
∧
b:(b,a)∈attacks d(a) ← ¬d(b)). In fat, the main dierene is their behavior w.r.t.
stable model semantis. In order to illustrate this dierene, let us onsider the
argumentation framework AF = 〈{a}, {(a, a)}〉. We an see that
ΓAF = {d(a) ∨ d(a)} ∪ {d(a)← d(a)}
and
α(AF ) = (d(a)← ¬d(a)) ∧ (d(a)← d(a))
It is lear that both formulæ have a minimal model whih is {d(a)}4; however α(AF )
has no stable models. This suggests that α(AF ) is not a suitable representation for
haraterizing preferred extensions by using stable models. Nonetheless we will see
that the stable models of ΓAF haraterize the preferred extensions of AF .
Even though, in this paper we are only interested in the preferred semantis, it
is worth mentioning that the stable models of the rst part of the formula α(AF )
i.e. (
∧
b:(b,a)∈attacks d(a) ← ¬d(b)), haraterize the so alled stable semantis in
argumentation theory (Dung 1995). It is also important to point out that α(AF )
and ΓAF have dierent use. On the one hand, we will see that ΓAF is a suitable
mapping for inferring preferred extensions by using stable model solvers. On the
other hand, α(AF ) has shown to be most suitable for studying abstrat argumenta-
tion semantis. For example in (Nieves et al. 2006), α(AF ) was used for dening an
extension of the preferred semantis. Also, sine the well-founded model of α(AF )
4
Notie that {d(a)} suggests that AF has a preferred extensions whih is {}.
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haraterizes the grounded semantis of AF , α(AF ) was used for dening exten-
sions of the grounded semantis and to desribe the interation of arguments based
on reasoning under the grounded semantis (Nieves et al. 2008).
In the following theorem we formalize a haraterization of the preferred seman-
tis in terms of positive disjuntive logi programs and stable model semantis.
Theorem 3
Let AF = 〈AR, attacks〉 be an argumentation framework and S ⊆ AR. S is a
preferred extension of AF if and only if compl(S) is a stable model of ΓAF .
Proof
See Appendix A.
Let us onsider the following example.
Example 3
Let AF be the argumentation framework of Fig. 2. We an see that ΓAF is:
d(a) ∨ d(b). d(a)← d(a).
d(b) ∨ d(a). d(b)← d(b).
d(c) ∨ d(b). d(c) ∨ d(e).
d(c)← d(a). d(c)← d(d).
d(d) ∨ d(c). d(d)← d(b), d(e).
d(e) ∨ d(d). d(e)← d(c).
ΓAF has two stable models whih are {d(a), d(c), d(e)} and {d(b), d(c), d(e), d(d))},
therefore {b, d} and {a} are the preferred extensions of AF.
Fig. 2. Graph representation of the argumentation framework AF =
〈{a, b, c, d, e}, {(a, b), (b, a), (b, c), (c, d), (d, e), (e, c)}
.
4.1 Default negation
As we have ommented in whole paper, ours mappings are inspired by two basi
onditions that make an argument to be defeated. One of the advantages of har-
aterizing the preferred semantis by using a logi programming semantis with
default negation, is that we an infer the aeptable arguments from the stable
models of ΓAF in a straightforward form. For instane, let ΛAF be the disjuntive
logi program ΓAF of Example 3 plus the following lauses:
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a← ¬d(a). b← ¬d(b).
c← ¬d(c). d← ¬d(d).
e← ¬d(e).
suh that the intended meaning of eah lause is: the argument x is aeptable if
it is not defeated. ΛAF has two stable models whih are {d(a), d(c), d(e), b, d} and
{d(b), d(c), d(e), d(d), a}. By taking the intersetion of eah model of ΛAF with AR
(the set of arguments of AF ), we an see that {b, d} and {a} are the preferred
extensions of AF . This idea is formalized by Proposition 4 below.
Denition 10
Let AF = 〈AR, attacks〉 be an argumentation framework. We dene its assoiated
general program as follows:
ΛAF =
⋃
a∈AR
{Γ(a) ∪ {a← ¬d(a)}}
Notie that Γ(a) and Λ(a) are equivalent, the main dierene between ΓAF and
ΛAF is the rule a← ¬d(a) for eah argument.
Proposition 4
Let AF = 〈AR, attacks〉 be an argumentation framework and S ⊆ AR. S is a
preferred extension of AF i there is a stable model M of ΛAF suh that S =
M ∩AR.
Proof
The proof is straightforward from Theorem 3 and the semantis of default negation.
It is worth mentioning that by using the disjuntive logi program ΛAF and the
DLV System, we an perform any query w.r.t. septial and redulous reasoning.
For instane let gamma-AF be the le whih ontains ΛAF suh that AF is the
argumentation framework of Fig. 2. Let us suppose we want to know if the argument
a belongs to some preferred extension of AF . Hene, let query-1 be the le:
a?
Let us all DLV with the brave/redulous reasoning front-end and query-1:
$ dlv -brave gamma-AF query-1
a is bravely true, evidened by {d(b), d(c), d(e), d(d), a}
This means that it is true that the argument a belongs to a preferred extension
and even more we have a preferred extension whih ontains the argument a. Now
let us suppose that we want to know if the argument a belongs to all the preferred
extensions of AF . Let us all DLV with the autious/septial reasoning front-end
and query-1:
$ dlv -autious gamma-AF query-1
a is autiously false, evidened by {d(a), d(c), d(e), b, d}
This means that it is false that the argument a belongs to all the preferred extensions
of AF . In fat, we have a ounterexample.
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5 Conlusions
Sine Dung introdued his abstrat argumentation approah, he proved that his
approah an be regarded as a speial form of logi programming with negation as
failure. In fat, he showed the grounded and stable semantis an be haraterized
by the well-founded and stable models semantis respetively. This result is impor-
tant beause it dened a general method for generating metainterpreters for argu-
mentation systems (Dung 1995). Conerning this issue, Dung did not give any har-
aterization of the preferred semantis in terms of logi programming semantis. It
is worth mentioning that aording to the literature (Prakken and Vreeswijk 2002;
ASPIC:Projet 2005; Pollok 1995; Bondarenko et al. 1997; Dung 1995), the pre-
ferred semantis is regarded as one of the most satisfatory argumentation seman-
tis of Dung's argumentation approah.
In this paper, we haraterize the preferred semantis in terms of minimal models
(see Theorem 1) and stable model semantis (see Theorem 3). These harateriza-
tions are based on two mapping funtions that onstrut a propositional formula
and a disjuntive logi program respetively. These haraterizations have as main
result the denition of a diret relationship between one of the most satisfatory ar-
gumentation semantis and may be the most suessful approah of non-monotoni
reasoning of the last two deades i.e. logi programming with the stable model
semantis. Based on this fat, we introdue a novel and easy-to-use method for
implementing argumentation systems whih are based on the preferred semantis.
It is quite obvious that our method will take advantage of the platform that has
been developed under stable model semantis for generating argumentation sys-
tems. For instane, we an implement the preferred semantis inside objet-oriented
programs based on our haraterization (Theorem 3, Proposition 4) and the DLV
JAVA Wrapper (Ria 2003).
We an see that our approah falls in the family of the model-heking meth-
ods for inferring the preferred semantis. In fat, our approah is losely related to
the methods suggested in (Besnard and Doutre 2004; Egly and Woltran 2006). As
seen in Theorem 1, our propositional formula α(AF ) is losely related to one of the
propositional formulæ (see Proposition 2) whih were suggested in (Besnard and Doutre 2004).
It is worth mentioning that the propositional formula suggested by (Egly and Woltran 2006)
for inferring the admissible sets of an argumentation framework is the same to
the propositional formula of Proposition 2. The main dierene between the ap-
proahes suggested by (Besnard and Doutre 2004; Egly and Woltran 2006) and our
approah is the strategy for inferring the models of a propositional formula. Instead
of using maximal models for haraterizing the preferred semantis as it is done dy
(Besnard and Doutre 2004), we are using minimal models/stable models. Hene,
we an use any system whih ould ompute minimal models/stable models of a
propositional formula. Maximality in Egly and Woltran' approah is heked on the
objet level, i.e. within the resulting Quantied Boolean formula (QBF).
An interesting property of our approah is that whenever we use stable model
solvers for omputing the preferred extensions of an argumentation framework, we
an ompute all the preferred extensions in full. In deision-making systems, it is not
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strange to require all the possible oherent points of view (preferred extensions) in
a dispute between arguments. For instane, in the medial domain when a dotor
has to give a diagnosis under inomplete information, he has to onsider all the
possible alternatives in his deisions (Cortés et al. 2005; Tolhinsky et al. 2005).
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof
First of all two observations:
1. Given M1,M2 ⊆ LT , it is true that M1 ⊂M2 i f(LT \M2) ⊂ f(LT \M1).
2. Given a propositional formula A, an interpretation M from LT to {0, 1} and x ∈
{0, 1}. Then it is not diult to prove by indution on A's length5 that M(A) = x
i f(LT \M)(g(A)) = x.
5
Sine A is a disjuntive lause, the length of A is given by the number of atoms in the head of
A plus the number of literals in the body of A.
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=> To prove that ifM is a maximal model of T then f(LT \M) is a minimal model
of g(T ). The proof is by ontradition. Let us suppose thatM is a maximal model
of T but f(LT \M) is a model of g(T ) and is not minimal. Then if f(LT \M) is
not minimal then there exists M2 suh that f(LT \M2) is a model of g(T ) and
f(LT \M2) ⊂ f(LT \M). Then by observation 2, if f(LT \M2) is a model of
g(T ) then M2 is a model of T . By observation 1, if f(LT \M2) ⊂ f(LT \M) then
M ⊂M2. But this is a ontradition beause M is a maximal model of T .
<= To prove that if f(LT \M) is a minimal model of g(T ) then M is a maximal
model of T . The proof is also by ontradition. Let us suppose that f(LT \M)
is a minimal model of g(T ) but M is model of T and is not maximal. If M is not
maximal, then exists a model M2 of T suh that M ⊂M2. Then by observation
2, if M2 is a model of T then f(LT \M2) is a model of g(T ). By observation 1,
if M ⊂ M2 then f(LT \M2) ⊂ f(LT \M). But this is a ontradition beause
f(LT \M) is a minimal model of g(T ).
Proof of Theorem 1
Proof
Two observations:
1. Sine the mapping f(x) orresponds to d(x), then compl(S) = f(AR \ S) beause
compl(S) = {d(a)|a ∈ AR \ S} and f(AR \ S) = {f(a)|a ∈ AR \ S}.
2. α(AF ) is logially equivalent to g(β(AF )):
g(β(AF )) =
∧
a∈AR
((¬d(a)→
∧
b:(b,a)∈attacks
d(b))∧(¬d(a)→
∧
b:(b,a)∈attacks
(
∨
c:(c,b)∈attacks
¬d(c))))
Sine a→
∧
b∈S b ≡
∧
b∈S(a→ b), we get:
∧
a∈AR
(
∧
b:(b,a)∈attacks
(¬d(a)→ d(b)) ∧ (
∧
b:(b,a)∈attacks
(¬d(a)→
∨
c:(c,b)∈attacks
¬d(c))))
By applying transposition and anelation of double negation in both impliations,
we get:
∧
a∈AR
(
∧
b:(b,a)∈attacks
(¬d(b)→ d(a)) ∧ (
∧
b:(b,a)∈attacks
(¬
∨
c:(c,b)∈attacks
¬d(c)→ d(a))))
Now, for the right hand side of the formula we need to apply Morgan laws:
∧
a∈AR
(
∧
b:(b,a)∈attacks
(¬d(b)→ d(a)) ∧ (
∧
b:(b,a)∈attacks
(
∧
c:(c,b)∈attacks
d(c)→ d(a))))
Finally by hanging → by ←, we get α(AF ).
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∧
a∈AR
(
∧
b:(b,a)∈attacks
(d(a)← ¬d(b)) ∧ (
∧
b:(b,a)∈attacks
(d(a)←
∧
c:(c,b)∈attacks
d(c)))) =
α(AF )
Now the main proof: S is a preferred extension of AF i (by Proposition 2) S is a
maximal model of β(AF ) i (by Proposition 1) f(AR \ S) is a minimal model of
g(β(AF )) i (by observations 1 and 2) compl(S) is a minimal model of α(AF ).
Proof of Proposition 3
First of all, let us introdue the following relationship between minimal models and
logi onsequene.
Lemma 1
(Osorio et al. 2004) For a given general program P , M is a model of P and P ∪
¬M˜) |= M i M is a minimal model of P .
This lemma was introdued in terms of augmented programs. Sine a general
program is a partiular ase of an augmented program, we write the lemma in terms
of general programs (see (Osorio et al. 2004) for more details about augmented
programs).
Proof
S is a preferred extension of AF i (by Theorem 1 ) compl(S) is a minimal
model of α(AF ) i (by lemma 1) compl(S) is a model of α(AF ) and α(AF ) ∧
SetT oFormula(¬ ˜compl(S)) |= SetT oFormula(compl(S)).
Proof of Theorem 3
Proof
S is a preferred extension of AF i ompl(S) is a minimal model of α(AF ) (by
Theorem 1) i compl(S) is a minimal model of ΓAF (sine ΓAF is logially equivalent
to α(AF ) in lassial logi) i ompl(S) is a stable model of ΓAF (sine ΓAF is a
positive disjuntive logi program and for every positive disjuntive logi program
P, M is a stable model of P i M is a minimal model of P).
